Dialogue of Dissent

Ever have those days when life gets in the way of studying? This has been my experience the last couple of days, but I should have expected this in the midst of the holidays. So I feel like I have slowed up a bit, but hopefully after this last festival (New Year’s Eve), I can get back to the routine.
I have recently finished Michele Dillon’s work, Catholic Identity: Balancing Reason, Faith, and Power. Dillon is looking at “pro-change” groups in the American Catholic context, and they ways in which they stay connected with, interact with, and try to differentiate from the greater Catholic tradition. All of the groups are more progressive, groups (gay rights, women’s ordination, and reproductive choice). What Dillon concludes is that it is not reason which allows small groups to stay connected and to continue to push for change (contra Habermas). Nor are groups relegated to silence, or risk being undermined in attempting to forge new ideas and practices while staying connected to a larger institutional tradition (contra Foucault). Dillon concludes that faith and power along with reason fuel, drive, and keep the efforts of these groups alive.
I found the work to be well research and done, but with a noticeable progressive bias. Dillon makes it seem like there are not any pro-change conservative groups. It is as if the Catholic tradition is so monolithic in its conservative leanings, that never would a less progressive individual want to push for change. Granted, the issues that Dillon is considering have been controlled by the conservatives, yet one could not argue that they are completely satisfied with change. Since Vatican II, many conservative thinking individuals have been pushing for a change in doctrine, liturgy, and hierarchy. Perhaps the most recent Pope, and his predecessor have pushed for much of that change, yet not all are satisfied.
A strength of Dillon’s work is that one could apply similar questions and conclusions to pro-change conservative groups (to a degree).
Now for a Baptist reflection. There are many point that have caused me to wonder. Dillon looks at the use of doctrine to counter doctrine among groups. I suppose Baptists do that with scripture, and to a lesser degree with our distinctives. The problem with using scripture is the variety of hermeneutics. Unless all are reading scripture in the same way, one cannot compare different passages, readings, or ideas. A literalist may quote a scripture, while a non-literalist would speak of the overall ethos and focus of the gospel. This is comparing apples to oranges.
The problem with the dinstictives is that they do not hold an authoritative place in the Baptist movement. They are guiding, and telling. They tell who we have been and where we have come from, and they can guide where we are going. Yet one does not often hold up church autonomy with the same doctrinal weight as a Catholic might. Clearly we need to continue the conversation among Baptist concern who we are and how we can understand and identify ourselves.
Finally, I hold up the idea of dissent. The dissenters in Dillon’s book (the pro-change group) are not willing to leave the church. They love Catholicism enough to put themselves through the strain and the challenges to try to change the institution. As Baptists we claim to tolerate dissent (I use the word “tolerate” deliberately). Ideas will prevail, but we will always tolerate the dissenting voice. I criticize those who claim to be Baptist, but will not continue in the dialogue of dissent. I question if they truly love the history and the ideals found within the Baptist movement. I also criticize the denomination that does not create a true platform where a dialogue of dissent can occur. Unity is important, but not at the expense of the whole body. Dissent is also important, but not at the expense of the whole body. We must find a way to give those who dissent full voice and a place at the table. We must continue to stay committed to the movement and the church enough to stay in dialogue with our dissent. So many of us have failed in so many ways.

the grammer of Baptists

I have just finished reviewing Lindbeck’s The Nature of Doctrine. It is a book that has become a classic of sorts for many theologians in the last decade. I planned on using it as a secondary or supplemental source, but things have changed. I have heard from one of my professors that my understanding of Wittgenstein is not up to par. He suggested that I look more at Lindbeck than at Wittgenstein – Witt is a dangerous person to us, because it is very easy to get him wrong. This was disappointing news, but I think my professor is right. Now, what I need to focus on is getting this !#*(& degree. So I can forgo Witt for now. I do not plan on forgetting about him, because I did think that Witt offers a powerful method to do theology that would have great implications for the Baptists.
But for now I turn to Lindbeck, who offers much to work with. Lindbeck is looking at doctrines within particular communities, and they ways in which those doctrines emerge. One of his concerns is towards the ecumenical movement, (which is not a concern of mine right now), but his theories are brilliant. Lindbeck looks to Geertz’s understanding of a “thick description” as a way to discern the doctrines and the theological grammar of a particular community. This is exactly what the Baptists need to do; we need to look closely at ourselves currently and historically to discern our doctrines and our theological grammar. It seems bold to claim that the Baptists actually hold doctrines, and it is something that needs to be considered. This is where I struggle; do Baptists actually hold to doctrines? I would venture to say “yes,” and even suggest that they come out of our baptism. A believer’s baptism suggest that the individual has the soul competency to make his or her own decision – freedom. It means that the churches must be free to allow the individual to discern his or her own call from God – Church autonomy. It means that the minister (priest) cannot tell the individual if he or she is or is not saved – priesthood of the believers. Yet there is a flaw in believer’s baptism if one ascribes to the doctrine of original, or at least there is a weakness. How soon until you gently persuade the individual to be baptized? Now we run the risk of sacramentiality. Lindbeck’s rule-theory et al offers much to consider for the Baptists. I will let Wittgenstein rest for a while, and follow the path Lindbeck sets before me (understanding full well that Wittgenstein influences Lindbeck).

the theology of religious freedom

Is religious freedom a theological construct? Or is religious freedom merely a political necessity to keep different religions from killing each other. After reading John Noonan’s book, The Lustre of Our Country, I find myself asking this question. First, let me say that Noonan’s book of superb. He looks at religious freedom in the American context from a number of different perspectives and in a number of different ways. He offers a fun diversity in styles that pulls out different nuances of the question. Great book, I highly recommend it!
Noonan argues that religious freedom is a theological construct. First, in arguing against Durkheim, Noonan claims, “You shall substitute neither State nor society for God nor suppose that religion may be analytically reduced to the self-worship of society.” Noonan is arguing that religion is more than a “unified system of beliefs and practices relating t sacred things,…set apart and forbidden, beliefs and practices which unite into a single moral community…” (Durkheim). Noonan argues against Bellah’s concept of a civil religion. And while he does not criticize it overtly, Noonan does not seem to fall within the understanding of Geertz’s “system of symbols.” Instead, Noonan claims that religion is a relationship to God, that there is a necessary personal aspect to religion that transcends the corporate understanding of civil religion. Not because an individual cannot love his or her country, but because a country cannot love back. While he does not cite the work, Noonan seems to be taking up an argument that Milbank is making in Theology and Social Theory, that theology cannot be explained through observation and social analysis. Noonan refuses to let religion be explained as a phenomenon of society; God exists, and humanity is striving to connect with God.
It is here that the conscious comes into play. To allow the individual to fully and freely connect with God, he or she must have complete freedom of that consciousness. This is the $20 word of the work – consciousness (or at least the word that Madison loves). Noonan states, “You shall acknowledge that religion itself requires religious freedom. Heart speaks to heart, spirit answers Spirit, freely.” On cannot help but notice the Rahnerian influence of transcendence and individuality. The individual will be drawn to the divine, and hopefully the Christian understanding of the divine. We must stay out of the way.
Yet can we say with all authenticity that the political construct, the 16 words in the First Amendment, are indeed theological? If the Catholics were in control, wouldn’t they want to make sure that people are free to choose God, but the God as they understand it? Even if it was without overt coercion, wouldn’t a Catholic state really want to increase its numbers in the pew? This was the idea that John Courtney Murray was arguing against as Noonan nicely illustrates. Or let’s be honest with the Baptists. While some Baptists, like Leland, wanted strict separation for theological and typological reasons (the state was never to be understood as the realm of God… back to Milbank), others like Backuus (whom Noonan lifts up) would like a looser separation, with ultimately a Baptist influenced and run state. For Backuus, the separation was a necessity, but not a theological necessity.
If it is theological, then how do we understand freedom in contrast with evangelism? Evangelism, by nature, is meant to coercive and persuade. If you think you have found the best thing, do you really think it is best to sit back and hope others are attracted to your movement? Or, to consider the abolitionist movement, if you see the State moving in a direction that is country to every moral fiber in your faith informed understanding, shouldn’t you try to change the direction of the state, and those religious movement which support it (Noonan considers these questions with slavery, polygamy, and temperance)?
This is an issue that Baptists are struggling with in a very real way right now. Freedom, to what extent? Even in the individual churches, freedom to what extent? Can we take a chance and allow churches to move in the way they see as best, even if it is against what we hold dear? Now we are entering into the realm of ecclesiology.
With the experiment of religious freedom, it seems that one could consider it in at least two ways. (1) From a non-theological point of view, the separation is a political necessity to avoid bloodshed among the various groups. Yet it is appropriate for religious movement to have influence over the political machine, policies, and direction. As long as other movements are tolerated, then it would be appropriate for one to have more power than others. Case in point – the recent political aspirations of the Religious Right. (2) We need to trust that God will lead us as a people working through the variety of religious groups. We need to influence the government, but understand when we unduly influence the faith and practice of another group we have gone to far. We are to be persuasive with each other, to try to influence each other, but never enforce one view over the other; the Holy Spirit will lead us to truth.
In a pluralistic society, the second option has a number of problems theologically, unless you understand the state as sanctioned by God, and guided by God.
I now understand why Noonan wrote his work, and why it was not a brief work – this is a question/issue that is complex. To solve it, or even understand it briefly would be an amazing (impossible) feat!

a feminist offering

Just finished reading She Who Is, by Elizabeth Johnson, and I would describe it as an excellent work of theology that happens to have a feminist focus. It is a work that does not overly push a feminist agenda to a degree that loses its academic credibility. I would highly recommend the last couple of chapters for those who are wrestling with the idea of the nature of God in the trinity, and in the unity. Johnson does some excellent work with language in trying to find a name for God that would include the woman’s experience. Overall, it is an excellent work.
Here’s where I am in my thoughts. Johnson claims that her theology begins at the experience of the woman. I understand how theology can emerge from such an experience, yet how can I enter into this particular level of theological discourse? Can I rest on a Kantian epistemology and just conceive the possibility of the experience? Would such an attempt be seen and accepted as valid? Most likely not. I recognize how Johnson is trying to hold up the diversity of all humans, yet the name Johnson suggests for God, “She Who Is,” is a name that is truly coming out a woman’s experience. I understand how this name for God can resonate with women, and may even move towards freeing their theology. Yet, is it a name that I could also use? Probably if it is not the only name of God that I employ. If I use a variety of names to describe God, then I am not longer confining God to one specific attribute or theological method of thought. Thus, I could claim that God is the holy creator, She Who Is, the one who calls us into Being, the Spirit-Sophia, and on and on. Even then, I imagine I would still circle around the names that I am most comfortable with.
Perhaps that is the challenge, to always be critically considering the names one has for God, and questioning is those names are still appropriate. Or, more broadly, to always be questioning and developing one’s theology, looking for the holes, and the constrictions one has placed upon God. Maybe then theology moves from and academic endeavor to a spiritual endeavor.

Two sources for one!

How can we use our sources of scripture and tradition? As I reread Jamie Phelps article “Communion Ecclesiology and Black Liberation Theology” (found in Theological Studies, December 200, vol. 61 no. 4, pg. 672-699), this question came to mind. The focus of Phelps’ article on the broader spectrum to include the Catholics in the Black theology movement, and more specifically, to consider the Catholic understanding of Communion Ecclesiology as a way to inform and liberate the blacks in America (specifically Black Catholics). Phelps offers a good survey of Black theology from the Protestant camp, and begins to offer some challenging theological ideas for Black liberation, yet nothing that is earth-shattering or grossly profound. Yet what Phelps does do is demonstrate a turning to the sources of tradition and scripture. For example, Phelps surveys some encyclicals offered through Catholic tradition that compels Catholics to work for a society of justice, mercy, and equality (Populorum progression, Octogesimo advenies, and Rerum novarum for example). She doesn’t emphasis scripture as much, but does reference Cone’s Thurman’s and King’s understanding of the compelling message of Christ resurrection as found in scripture. The majority of Phelp’s article is based on Catholic tradition.
It is no surprise to me that the bulk of Phelps’ article reaches to tradition – she is Catholic, after all. If we were to read a Protestant theologian’s account it would most likely be rooted in scripture. What I am wondering is if there is a way to use both? In the Baptist movement, we have no problem looking at the scriptural basis. Yet what would we find from our tradition? The ABC/USA has a number of statements of concern, resolutions, and other “official” statements which hold very little power or punch. Can we use the examples of individuals as sources of our tradition? Can we use the statements of one or two theologians? Perhaps this is an example of a moment when our diversity (especially the diversity of the ABC/USA) can be a true strength. As a white Baptist, I have little history to look to and swell with pride – I have plenty to be ashamed. Yet can I be so bold as to turn to the heritage of my Black Baptist brothers and sisters, and clam that history as an informing history. It is a risky endeavor, but one that needs to be considered.

just an "ok" history

What makes a history book good, and what makes it excellent? This is something I was thinking about as I read The History of Black Catholics in the United States by Cyprian Davis. It is a good history that tells a through and detailed story of the history of black Catholics, but it is not excellent. The majority of Davis’ attention is spent on the role and actions of leadership with the back Catholics and the leadership in the Catholic church. It seemed that Davis we more concerned with the acceptance, or lack of, the evangelization, or lack of, and the integration, or lack of, of black Catholics with the larger Catholic movement in America. What I found missing was a story of the Catholics who joined and stayed with the Catholics. How did it feel to be isolated from White America due to race, and isolated from Black America due to religion? Did Black Catholics face the same kind of persecution and suspicion that white Catholics faced from Protestants? These are questions that Davis neglected to answer. It is good to tell the story of Black Catholics, but the surface has only been scratched by Davis. We have a good history book, why not an excellent one?

A High Catholic Imagination

Just finished reading Greeley’s The Catholic Imagination. Greeley is making an interesting argument that Catholicism infuses one with an “imagination,” or an awareness of a “haunted presence of the Holy Spirit and grace in all of creation.” He claims that this awareness shows up most clearly in high culture. Greeley spends an entire chapter on just the church building as an example of this Catholic imagination in high culture.
Greeley also makes the distinction between high tradition and popular tradition. High tradition is what comes from the leaders and the theologians of the religious movement. Popular tradition is what one learns as one is “coming home from school.” This work is a good example of sociology taking the front seat to theology. There is a theology implicit in Greeley’s work, but the cultural studies have become more important that the idea itself of a “sacramental consciousness.” All Greeley cites is David Tracy’s Analogical Imagination; a good work, but only one in the field.
I wonder if Greeley is closing his sample set when he is looking only at “high culture” for the Catholic imagination. Granted, Greeley is looking at movies as well, but leans towards those which may be less accessible. What about the Catholic imagination in Notre Dame Football – not a high culture endeavor? Or what about the Catholic imagination in neighborhood ethnic club in Chicago or Philadelphia? These would have been primarily Catholic strongholds in the 1920s and on, but ones that would have been separate from the Catholic church. It is interesting that Greeley holds up “popular tradition” as, in a sense, the true Catholic religion, but does not look at “low culture.”
Finally I wonder if these implications carry into the Baptist movement. Greeley makes a lot of general Protestant claims in comparison to the Catholic claims, yet because of the scope of the work, does not look more closely at the different strains of the Protestant movement. What would the Baptist imagination look like if there is one? What aspects of the Baptist movement would be found in the popular tradition? Perhaps, we need to look seriously at that which Greeley argues maintains the Catholic tradition – the story tellers. People to pass on the stories, the narrative and the values of the Baptist movement encourage and enrich the popular imagination. We need to claim our movement as just that to tell the stories of who we are, and why we are as Baptists.

Baptist and Dissent

Been busy for a couple of days. I wanted to note that I am not planning on writing any more about the religion and postmodernism conference, because it has been so long since the conference. The ideas have become fuzzy in my head, and notes are not enough.
This past weekend, I went to the AAR annual meeting, for the day. I only got to attend on paper reading on ecclesiology, which was interesting. I did have an interesting conversation with my dissertation director. Among other things, we talked about the Baptist identity of dissent. Wm. Brackney, among others, argue that dissent is an essential aspect of Baptist identity. Not only are Baptists known to dissent from the popular or prevailing opinion, but Baptists also make the room for dissent of all peoples. We considered the catophatic (spelling?) representation of the apophatic (spelling?) understanding of dissent. In other words, how does one display this thread of dissent, as it is understood, in the concrete life of the church? Further, how much does dissent shape the Baptist movement and the particular church? One could argue that many churches do not, in fact, make room for the voice of dissent. Rather, churches look for uniformity amongst the members. Would one still consider those churches Baptists? If there is room for dissent, then there is always room for soul freedom. Perhaps, then, we could consider the non-dissenting churches and not really Baptists churches. A stance I am leaning towards embracing more and more. Unless these churches are dissenting from the stance of dissent. Then it becomes circular, and still moot if the churches do not leave a space open for dissent. Finally, how is dissent displayed, or practiced, liturgically? Some good things to think about.

choose your own adventure ethics

I have just finished re-reading Time Past, Time Future by John Gallagher. The work is basically an historical survey of Moral Theology. While the beginning of the work seems fairly harmless, by the end of the work, Gallagher is clearly presenting and pushing a specific theological agenda. But first, a couple of thoughts on the historical survey. It is interesting that Moral Theology arrives from the pastoral rather than the academic context. I wonder what a theology of ethics would look like if it was purly formulated in an academic context. Granted, Gallagher points out the influence of Thomism as Moral Theology emerged and evolved, but it is clear that it began with the priests and confession. Perhaps a better question would be, what is the difference between Moral Theology, in its basic historical root, and Liberation Theology. Both seem to start with the experience of the people, but Moral Theology has had enough years to be sanitized by the academy and the Magisterium. Yet on a deeper level, Moral Theology is responding to the sin of the people and the way to achieve salvation, while Liberation Theology seems to be addressing the salvation of the people and the sin of society. This is a fundamental difference between focusing on the “rule” of God vs. the experience of the people. I am not sure where I would fall with the two – probably somewhere between the two.
Another point that Gallagher makes is the unique nature of American theology. It is something that emerges in the 1890sm, is squished, and then again after VII. Gallagher seems to cautiously be pushing proportionism (the Catholic version of situation ethics al la Fletcher). In proportionism, the individual chooses based on the teological end, the means to the end and the motive of the individual. The magisterium has more or less condemned this approach, but Gallagher still seems to embrace it. I can understand the Magisterium’s caution – such an approach could lead one to make decision leading to things like….abortion (shudder?) or use of birth control (gasp), or who know what else. Yet moral truisms that leave little room for negotiation can (as the proportionists argue) lead to other sins. Ah the muddy realm of ethics… didn’t Wittgenstein say something about the inarticulate nature of ethics?

Sharing hope

I just finished re-reading Gaudium et Spes. As a Baptist, I find reading Catholic works interesting. It is difficult for me to give authority that was written by a bunch of men in pointy hat, but I guess millions of Catholics like what they do (or at least they accept the writings). Every time I read GS, I am stirred to dream about the ideal church and the ideal Christian. We have a picture of a church that works towards the betterment of all humanity, that pushes toward economic justice, family values, and the development of science, art, and reason (all within limits). The Christian is the person who has a family, educates the children, pays taxed, and considers the neighbor, all in a days work. It is a nice idea. Of course I need to remember what a breakthrough this work was in 1965. It is a big deal for the OTC (one true church, as my Catholic friend would claim) to say that it is actually interested and connected with the hopes and joys, grief and sorrow of the world. It was as if the church, after 2000 years finally decided to start interacting with the world… well not quite, but close. I wonder if the church can work with society towards the betterment of the individual without losing its own identity (this is a critique I have of liberalism). In this case, GS continues to state that the truth of Jesus Christ is the driving force and the focus of all progress. I suppose that focus would keep one honest. It is an interesting position to take in interfaith dialogue, but probably an authentic one.

Religion and Postmoderism part 4

Moving right along, next we have Robert Bernasconi, “Why Athens and Jerusalem”
This paper looked at the debate between Derrida and Lebiniz, using it as a starting off point to consider the difference and similarity between Jewish thinking and Greek thinking. Bernasconi considered the tension towards Jewish thinking, and its separation from Greek philosophy – or at least the impression that there was a separation. He showed how Lebiniz did not try to separate the two, but looked to a synthesis similar to the Greek translation of the LXX. The works would be Greek in form but Hebrew in context. For example, the Greek concept of justice is a way to articulate the justice that is found in the prophets. I have hardly touched the depth of the paper, and I know I am not even coming close to giving Bernasconi justice in the work he did, his point in the end seemed to be, “why Athens and why Jerusalem?” Why do we need to have these two poles in particular set up? In the current context, we may wonder about Washington D.C. and Tehran, and a pole such as this one has very different philosophical and theological implications. Bernasconi showed that the poles of Athens and Jerusalem no longer seem to hold, but have been synthesized. So, the question that I pull from Bernasconi’s work is, what are the poles today that shape and direct our thinking, politics, theology, and other?

Religion and Postmodernism part 3

Moving right along, the next paper was presented by Simon Critchley, titled “The Catechism of the Citizen” (this was a change from his original title “The Need for Civil Religion in Politics, Law and Religion in and after Rousseau”).
I have not read much Rousseau at all, so my knowledge of the paper is weak at best. Yet I will still try to give some kind of summary of what I heard.
One of the points that Critchley made which stood out for me was the idea of the law in the social contract. According to Critchley, Rousseau did not agree with Locke or Hume, but saw law as a way to hold the tensions of society together. The law is something that is learned from an early age. Citizens have to be formed to obey the law, and to participate with the general will. Thus a love of law is essential. The law must rule the citizen’s hearts and form the passions. Critchley stated that laws are acts/expressions of the general will. Religion is not a necessary part of the law, but can be used to shape the hearts of the people (or can be a deterrent to call the people away. I know there is much more, but I was nodding off during this presentation, and I am not a Rousseau scholar. A point that I think Critchley was making was that politics can shape a person to obey the law, and can be seen as a form of religion. Or religion can take the form of politics to shape the heart of the individual. The point (if I got it right) is well put. The way we shape individuals in the churches can shape the way they follow (or not) the law. If nothing else, it puts a great deal of power in the hands of politics. I know I missed much in this paper, but this is what I have.

Where does faith come from, Kierkegaard?

Let’s take a little break from the Villanova conference. I just finished reading Philosophical Fragments by Soren Kierkegaard. I have to admit, this is not directly for my doctoral work, but is for a reading group I belong to… but then again, everything I read will in one way or another influence my doctoral work.
I also have to admit that I have not read much Kierkegaard – Fear and Trembling in seminary (btw, I am an Andover Newton Theological School alum). So it was a pleasant experience. I particularly liked the idea of a suffering love, and that God makes God’s self become like us out of love. I like the idea of the paradox as the source of one’s passion in learning and growing. What I am stuck on is the idea that faith is given by God. I may have not read closely enough, but I seemed to get the impression in the last chapter that we are not born with faith (a ludicrous thought!), and that we cannot gain faith by just learning about the historical event. The only way we can receive faith is from God. Yet, doesn’t that immediately make the relationship unequal. For Kierkegaard, the suffering love is God becoming one of us, to fully enter into a relationship where we have the opportunity to say “yes.” But how can we say “yes” if we aren’t given the faith from God? I suppose one could take a universalism approach and claim that God has given faith to everyone, and we just need to realize that faith. We would need to be careful to avoid claiming that the faith is a part of our nature – again something that Kierkegaard would see as ludicrous. We can’t share our faith but only out of our own experience. The individual needs to be free to receive the transformation on his or her own. So where does faith come from, if not our own inner-experience.

Religion and Postmoderism part 2

The next paper was presented by Stanley Hauerwas, A Haunting Possibility: Christianity and Radical Democracy
Hauerwas started out with a description of R. Coles’ understanding of “radical democracy.” Coles’ stated that his understanding of democracy was haunted by Yoder… we’ll get to that.
Some of the key points (as I understood them) in Coles’ RD are that democracy is a process that we are in search of, it is an activity, and is always beyond the actual democracy as we practice/know it. RD occurs when we go beyond the dominant forms to practice radical hospitality especially to the least of the society. This evokes the idea of preferential option of the poor – a concept that is often found in Liberation theology. The radical hospitality first to the least is a concept that Goizueta suggests. But I digress…
A community that practices RD works on listening, establishing stories, and making space at the table for all stories – similar to the idea that Welch presented.
Hauerwas then turned to Yoder. Yoder claims that politics creates the crucial ground for radical democracy, but it is politics based upon the cross – this is where Coles is haunted. (See Yoder’s Politics of Jesus) Yoder’s idea is connected to tradition, but is still open to others. It strongly challenges what it means to be a disciple of Jesus, it comes out of a community gathered (church), and has to stay connected to Jesus.
This politics is against the politics of Constantine – which is when the church works to learn and see from the world. It is in a level of engagement where the world tells the church what it needs to be.
RD works best on at the local level against the hierarchal. I think this is a very Baptist idea (but then again, Yoder is an Anabaptist), but Hauerwas connected to Augustine. Hauerwas claims that the speech of the empire is an orientation to death that looks to the significance of life. (Also Augustine) In the empire lying, self-deception, and a love of glory are held up. The best response that comes from Christianity is the martyr that does not depend on glory but on the glory of the communion of the saints.
The church is to challenge the world to what it can be, as a people who seek justice rather than glory.
Overall, I think we find a kind of Christ above culture typology (thanks Neibuhr!). The “haunting” challenge is that the politics which Coles is seeking, and many other secularists is only offered by Christianity. Yet where is the space for the other faith? This approach seems to go to the other extreme from Welch’s approach. I like the idea of staying true to the cross, but does staying true to the cross mean you must leave room for other stories. Again, where is the space for evangelism? But I may be missing something…

Religion and Postmoderism part 1

This past weekend I attended the Religion and Postmodernism conference at Villanova University. The focus of the conference was Athens and Jerusalem – Politics and Religion. It was a very engaging conference with a number of great papers presented. Since I am still a kind of neophyte in the field, I found myself struggling at times to follow the discussion, and at other times I was able to keep up with the discussion. Partly it depended on the topic of discussion – I can only study so much. I was happy to see that my tweed jacket fit in well with other’s tweed jackets.
What I plan to do in the next couple of entries is reflect on the papers presented. I missed the first paper which was presented on behalf of Metz, so I will start with Sharon Welch’s presentation. I do not presume to have the capacity to fully explain, or even partially explain the works, but I hope in reflecting I can engage some further thoughts, and sort some of the cobwebs out that were formed in my own mind.
Paper 1 – Sharon Welch – “Politics after Empire: Dangerous Memories, Cultivated Awareness and Enlivening Engagement”
Welch started with the question of power in American politics, citing Kane’s The Power of Story, claiming that we are stories. For example we have the story of EuroAmerica and the story of Indigenous America, and while the two overlap, they are not necessarily the same. In thinking about story, we are drawn to the question of evil in the story of politics. Welch suggests that destroying evil is insanity, and cannot be accomplished. She also rhetorically wondered if peacekeeping is also helpful with the question of evil in politics.
The story in American politics that engaged evil in a positive way is the Civil Rights movement. In that movement, direct action coerces evil in a way that could be positive or negative. (I think that what was Welch was saying, but I may be getting it wrong). Welch seemed to suggest that a dualist view of evil is not helpful, but a non-dualist approach offer another view. She turned to Buddhism for insight into this approach, specifically “Engaged Buddhism.” In this approach, emptiness and knowing versus non-knowing are emphasized. This is an approach that views knowledge as a gift to share and to receive. The ideal story is to share the emptiness where speech can be heard and shared.
At this point I was nodding off, and I very well may have missed one or two major points Welch was trying to make. I think Welch is trying to find a way for different stories to influence each other in a non-coercive way. Further, for a way for one group of people with one story to name an evil that comes from another group of people’s story. The Buddhist approach offers a way for engagement and sharing of knowledge that does not force or coerce. I do not think one can truly share without “persuading” (that sounds nicer than coercing). What if an Evangelical Christian was sharing with a Jew? It is the story of the Evangelical to try to convince the other (in this case the Jew) to convert. If the Evangelical did not try to do this, then he or she would not be true to his or her story. Further, by suggesting a method of interaction that comes from a specific story (in this case Engaging Buddhism), is in essence forcing one story upon other stories. I admire the idea, but wonder if it would work in reality.
Regardless, one should start with truly knowing one’s own story, otherwise one could be swept up into someone else’s story.
I’m sure I bungled up a lot of the details, but that was the basics of what I took from Welch’s paper.

Roman Catholics in America

Utah Phillips laments the grouping of history in decades (i.e. 80s, 90s, 50s, 60s), because time doesn’t fit that well into neat ten year packages. Patrick Carey avoids the grouping of decades in his book Roman Catholics in America – the recent book that I read. Instead, Carey groups the time by the movements that occurred over the dates through which they occurred. For example, 1776-1815 is “A Free Church in the Republic,” and 1866-1899 is “Towards Americanism.” It is a good way of looking at time that tends to the story of Catholicism rather than the bland meta-narrative of America that tries to force things into decades.
With that said, Carey’s book is good… very good. He is through, organized and focused. What I am trying to figure out is what is Carey’s agenda. What was Carey trying to push, or argue with his book? I would first suppose that Carey is arguing that there IS an American Catholic history. Carey is suggesting that there is a story to tell, but we’ve heard that before. I think Carey is arguing that Catholicism was always a reaction to Protestantism. For example, the Trustee controversies was partially caused by the republican context of the culture. Constantly, Catholics are reacting to American culture. Along with that, I think Carey is pushing a more “progressive” understanding of Catholicism. While Carey goes to great lengths to be fair, there seem to be more emphasis on the left side of Catholicism than the right.
Overall, it was an excellent book that give a great look at the history of the Roman Catholics in America.

Well, I just finished reading and taking the notes on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It is a slow read for such a short book (108 pages). Part of the reason why it took so long to read Witt’s work is that he writes in aphorisms (short and compact sentences). It is not something you can glance over, but something that demands a lot of time and attention. It was difficult reading this work because I know that Witt rejected a lot of the content in he later teachings and in the Philosophical Investigations. Yet I still found some interesting and useful ideas.
One idea is that everything must make some kind of consistent sense with everything else. In a church setting this is something that I think we neglect due to laziness. For example, we say it means something to be ordained, but we do not hold onto that meaning unless we find it helpful at the time. That is inconsistent. Or we say that we are called to a certain way of living as Christians, but we do not hold closely to that way of living. When we are inconsistent, we are projecting the true picture of Christianity that we ascribe to. Either we change the picture or we change our “grammar.” We need to be consistent. Witt broke down the parts to the bare examples, but I think we can apply his ideas to church life and beyond.
The other thing I (and other scholars) am interested in is Witt’s idea of the ethical. In 6.421 he claims that “ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental” In 6.422 he states “ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the ordinary action.” It seems like Witt is trying to connect with something greater than he can articulate. Why do people do good things? He then moves to the mythical, which he describes as inexpressible. I think this is a good description of God. Yet the problem arises when we still try to talk about God, knowing that we cannot talk about God. How can we talk about God when there is nothing we can say? In other writings, Witt claims that we are showing the nature of God when we talk about God. I wonder if this is true of all religious speech. When we claim that we are to love our enemies, are we showing the nature of God? When we claim that we go to church to praise God, what does that say about the nature of God, and our relationship with God. Finally, what would it mean if we claimed that all religious language falls short and only expresses the divine through a glass dimly? Then do we have any truth we can claim?
Are you lost yet?

Popular Baptists?

I just finished reading Roberto S. Goizueta’s Caminemos Con Jesus: Toward a Hispanic/Latino Theology of Accompaniment. It is a good work with a lot to glean. One of the points that Goizueta makes is the influence of popular Catholicism. The terms itself is interesting because it suggests that there is a different Catholicism then just “popular Catholicism” (PC). PC is what is practiced by the people, it is the rituals and customs that are particular to a group.
I wonder if there is a “Popular Baptists.” Actually, I fear that there is a “popular Baptists.” My impression is that the “popular Baptist” movement consists of a herd of people waving their arms in the air, voting the way that Dobson or Falwell suggests and loving the bible more than they love Jesus. I am a Baptist that believes in soul freedom, in dissent, in church autonomy, in the authority of scripture (but never over the authority of Christ) and so on and so on. I am probably not a “popular Baptist” for a lot of reasons. When I consider Goizueta’s idea of PC I wonder if I should stop calling myself a Baptist. It seems to me that PB have gone to far from the original, basic ideas of the Baptist movement, so either they have stopped being Baptist, or I can no longer be understood as a Baptist. The difference is that Goizueta’s PC still have a connection with the greater tradition of Catholicism. My gut feeling is that part of my role is to call the PB back to the greater tradition of the Baptist movement (which suggests that we do have a tradition). It is a cause that will no doubt end up in martyrdom, but what else do I have to do?

finishing my crazy rant of what I hope to do

Ok, lets try to finish my prospectus and then onto other thoughts. Baptist ordination – it does mean something, it is just that most Baptists haven’t done a good job articulating ordination. So here I am, with all of the answers (hardly). My theory is that Baptist theology is not something that we can particularly say but something that can be shown (see early Wittgenstein). The way Baptist act around the minister, talk about the minister and treat the minister shows the theology of ordination. What I aim to do (if I ever get to that point) is to look at one or two churches, and consider how they have treated the minister over time – always comparing with the “teachings of the tradition” – the manuals and writings of the time. This is really very cursory, but hopefully you get the idea. If not, leave a comment.
My hypothesis is that one changes in ordination via one’s relationship to the church/community. No longer is the individual just a member of the congregation, but is now a leader of the congregation. Yet there we still hold to the idea of Priesthood of the believers, so the change is not one of hierarchy. Instead it is of relationship. The minister now represents something greater, something more profound than him or her self. The Catholic idea of Sacramental Consciousness offers a good way to articulate this change. We just need to change the word from Sacrament to Sacred so people in the pews wont freak out.
That’s it. Make sense?

Intermission

Life happens, and posting on a blog becomes difficult. Hopefully, life will happen differently, and posting on a blog will no longer be difficult. Regardless, I will finish the earlier post about my prospectus soon (I hope). In the meantime, I'll tease you with some one-word statements about my work:

Baptist
Wittgenstein
Social-Historical
Catholic
sacramental Consciousness
McClendon
Theology

Let's see if you can make any sense out of that!

I just finished reading Jonathan Edwards: A Life by George Marsden, and a biography of Wittgenstein.

Language is key!

writing

Today I haven’t done much reading for two reasons. (1) I have to preach tomorrow, so I spent a good amount of time working on a sermon. (2) I have been reworking my prospectus draft. I suppose I should now discuss my prospectus. My large focus is Baptist ecclesiology. My feeling is that many, if not most Baptist theologians are not willing to claim that as Baptists we do indeed have an ecclesiology. Because that topic is to big, I am going to narrow it down specifically to ordination. So I am going to look into the Baptist theology of ordination. Now it is late, and I am tired, so part two will have more on the prospectus.

picture context

Today I made some notes from the first six chapters of the Wittgenstein bio. A couple of things stood out for me. One is the level of intensity that Wittgenstein holds in his work. It seems as if he is truly trying to embody his philosophy. It might be interesting to compare this to the idea of theoisis (spelling). The other is the picture theory of language. So far, I understand picture theory as something representing something else that cannot be parsed down to the single atom - word - symbol. Thus we have ways of speaking about God, but we do not have a set combination of words that will completely describe God in a total holistic way. We can only paint a picture. A danger is that when two people look at a picture, they can see two different things, and one cannot control the other. Thus we have the picture of the bible, but two people can see very different things in the same Bible. Hmm….
Finally I enjoyed the difference between saying and showing. I can say I am a Christian or I can show that I am a Christian. I wonder if the showing is painting the picture. If one could never fully say what it means to be a Christian, than it may be more appropriate to show and let the picture speak for itself.
I have read these ideas before, but to read them in a bio is very informative. Context, context, context.

I just got to the part where Wittgenstein is going to the front lines. What drives a person to look for such danger?

a Suffering God?

Finally finished reading and the notes for Fox’s God and Communion. If nothing else, it is an excellent example of comparing Eastern and Western theologies - except that Johnson’s theology is not a typical Western Theology. Regardless, it is an excellent work. I am struck by Johnson’s understanding of the suffering of God. It is a place of power when God suffers, according to Johnson. When one is in perfect relationship, one will suffer just because others suffer. I wonder if God desires a time when suffering is not. That would be an interesting way to understand the eschatological bent of Zizioulas. Johnson’s understanding of suffering is the best one I have read thus far that is not from a blatant process theology position. It also has an interesting impact upon Ecological issues. The earth suffers and so God suffers. I think one weakness is that “suffering” was not adequately defined. It is talked about as a power and relation, and then written off as a “female emotion,” which I think is bunk. I wonder if we ought to read Foucault’s understanding of power and authority and then apply that to suffering.
Now I get to read more about Wittgenstein.

Trinity and Wittgenstein

Been a while since my last entry, but that is to be expected. Today I touched upon two works. God as Communion by Patricia A. Fox, and The Duty of Genius by Ray Monk.
Fox’s work is comparing the theologies of Zizioulas and Elizabeth Johnson - specifically the Trinity. A couple of things caught my attention thus far. Zizioulas considers the eschaton as a unifying aspect of the trinity - we are all leading toward the end where our relationship with God is perfected. If Zizioulas did not emphasis the diversity and the essential nature of the person, I would fear that he was heading toward a Hegelian understanding of God and time (not to mention that his Eastern context frees him from the Hegelian influence). Johnson reminds us that God is unknowable, and that we can never truly name God. Yet she then proceeds to name God - I guess it is necessary to offer any kind of work. She then lambastes the patriarchal dominance of God’s name, claiming that God cannot have a gender. Yet she proceeds to name God “she” claiming a kind of retribution from centuries of male dominance. I am sure that I am missing some of the nuance of her argument, but this is an initial impression. As I finish the work, no doubt my position will shift.
Monk’s work is a biography of Wittgenstein, and very well done thus far. I have been impressed with the emphasis upon Wittgenstein’s passion to follow philosophy/logic. He almost seems neurotic in his vocational pursuits. I wonder if I could even match a fraction of that passion. I wonder if I want to.

Which came first - culture or individual?

Today I took notes on chapters in From the Heart of Our People, ed. by Orlando O. Espin and Miguel H. Diaz. The book is a collection of essays on Latino/a Catholic Systematic Theology; specifically U.S. Hispanic theology. I think one of the premises of the book is that there is a difference between U.S. Hispanic theology and Central American theology. One of the essays I particularly enjoyed was “Fiesta - life in the subjunctive” The author spoke about praising God for that which is going to happen. Another author spoke of the nuance of time and agency. In that essay, the historical presence of Christ makes the sad and the happy more holy - it is a very incarnational theology. I wonder about the heavy reliance upon the experience of the people. I wonder if one could fall into the Tillician correlational trap of being led by culture in our theological queries. Yet on the other hand, I think these authors would argue that one cannot escape the impact culture has on theology, and it is the job of the theologian to be aware of that effect. Hence the essay about hermunatics from a Western or an indigenous point of view. I have not yet finished the work.
The other work I read today was Ordination: Celebrating the Gift of Ministry by Stephen Sprinkle. I have only read the introduction. The author speaks of the “oddness” of Christianity and of ordination. The Free Church approach (I.e. priesthood of all believers) does not make sense from the eyes of the world, yet works with the Holy Spirit. I am interested to see what Sprinkle offers, and assume that it will have a hierarchal edge to it.

making snail-like progress

I have been working, but not as quickly as I would like. So far I have finished Hartshorne’s book, I’ve read Dominus iesus, and am almost finished with Doyle’s Communion Ecclesiology. Hopefully later today I can offer some thoughts on those readings.

Taskmaster

I am trying to prepare for my doctoral exams so I can write a book that no one will leave. Unfortunately, my diligence is less then I would hope, and my reading wanes from time to time. So I'm going to try to use this blog as an academic journal of sorts. To the best of my ability, I will summarize the day(s) readings/research. So all you who are reading this can keep up on the edge-of-the-seat work I am engaged in. Hopefully this will help me keep to task.

With that said, yesterday I read a chapter from Hartshorne's book "Omnipotence and other theological mistakes" about creation ex nihili. Hartshorne thinks it is a "magic" idea that emphasizes the transcendence of God to much. I don't think I can completely agree. I think is polemic is based upon an exaggerated anthropomorphic notion of God.
I also read a section from Doyle's book, "Communion Ecclesiology," looking at views appropriation of Communion Ecclesiology language in things like Lumen Gentium and Gaudium et Spes. The Sacramental notion of the church caught my eye - it is through the Eucharist that the local church is connected with the universal. So how is that different from the Orthodox? Volf's "After Our Likeness" offers some decent insight.

Hopefully today I'll finish the chapter from Doyle, and finish Hartshorne's book. Yet it is my anniversary, so I may not get to read today.

Hartshorne - another arrogant

I’m reading, along with everything else, Hartshorne’s “Omnipotence and other theological mistakes.” He is arrogant, but good. The jury is still out if I agree with all of his critiques and proposals.

Narcissistic blogging

So I haven't told anyone about this blog. I haven shared with anyone. I haven't even updated my proflie. So am I engaging in a self-serving, narcissistic blogging? Is that a question I can even ask when no one is going to read this, or is question still valid because there is the potential for someone to read this?

suckind in by another blog

I only created this blog to respond to another blog - but since I'm here I'll share the occasional rant.