Just finished reading Greeley’s The Catholic Imagination. Greeley is making an interesting argument that Catholicism infuses one with an “imagination,” or an awareness of a “haunted presence of the Holy Spirit and grace in all of creation.” He claims that this awareness shows up most clearly in high culture. Greeley spends an entire chapter on just the church building as an example of this Catholic imagination in high culture.
Greeley also makes the distinction between high tradition and popular tradition. High tradition is what comes from the leaders and the theologians of the religious movement. Popular tradition is what one learns as one is “coming home from school.” This work is a good example of sociology taking the front seat to theology. There is a theology implicit in Greeley’s work, but the cultural studies have become more important that the idea itself of a “sacramental consciousness.” All Greeley cites is David Tracy’s Analogical Imagination; a good work, but only one in the field.
I wonder if Greeley is closing his sample set when he is looking only at “high culture” for the Catholic imagination. Granted, Greeley is looking at movies as well, but leans towards those which may be less accessible. What about the Catholic imagination in Notre Dame Football – not a high culture endeavor? Or what about the Catholic imagination in neighborhood ethnic club in Chicago or Philadelphia? These would have been primarily Catholic strongholds in the 1920s and on, but ones that would have been separate from the Catholic church. It is interesting that Greeley holds up “popular tradition” as, in a sense, the true Catholic religion, but does not look at “low culture.”
Finally I wonder if these implications carry into the Baptist movement. Greeley makes a lot of general Protestant claims in comparison to the Catholic claims, yet because of the scope of the work, does not look more closely at the different strains of the Protestant movement. What would the Baptist imagination look like if there is one? What aspects of the Baptist movement would be found in the popular tradition? Perhaps, we need to look seriously at that which Greeley argues maintains the Catholic tradition – the story tellers. People to pass on the stories, the narrative and the values of the Baptist movement encourage and enrich the popular imagination. We need to claim our movement as just that to tell the stories of who we are, and why we are as Baptists.
A collection of reflections and rants from a sometimes angry, often snobby, dangerously irreverent, sacramental(ish), and slightly insane Baptist pastor
Thursday, November 23, 2006
Wednesday, November 22, 2006
Baptist and Dissent
Been busy for a couple of days. I wanted to note that I am not planning on writing any more about the religion and postmodernism conference, because it has been so long since the conference. The ideas have become fuzzy in my head, and notes are not enough.
This past weekend, I went to the AAR annual meeting, for the day. I only got to attend on paper reading on ecclesiology, which was interesting. I did have an interesting conversation with my dissertation director. Among other things, we talked about the Baptist identity of dissent. Wm. Brackney, among others, argue that dissent is an essential aspect of Baptist identity. Not only are Baptists known to dissent from the popular or prevailing opinion, but Baptists also make the room for dissent of all peoples. We considered the catophatic (spelling?) representation of the apophatic (spelling?) understanding of dissent. In other words, how does one display this thread of dissent, as it is understood, in the concrete life of the church? Further, how much does dissent shape the Baptist movement and the particular church? One could argue that many churches do not, in fact, make room for the voice of dissent. Rather, churches look for uniformity amongst the members. Would one still consider those churches Baptists? If there is room for dissent, then there is always room for soul freedom. Perhaps, then, we could consider the non-dissenting churches and not really Baptists churches. A stance I am leaning towards embracing more and more. Unless these churches are dissenting from the stance of dissent. Then it becomes circular, and still moot if the churches do not leave a space open for dissent. Finally, how is dissent displayed, or practiced, liturgically? Some good things to think about.
This past weekend, I went to the AAR annual meeting, for the day. I only got to attend on paper reading on ecclesiology, which was interesting. I did have an interesting conversation with my dissertation director. Among other things, we talked about the Baptist identity of dissent. Wm. Brackney, among others, argue that dissent is an essential aspect of Baptist identity. Not only are Baptists known to dissent from the popular or prevailing opinion, but Baptists also make the room for dissent of all peoples. We considered the catophatic (spelling?) representation of the apophatic (spelling?) understanding of dissent. In other words, how does one display this thread of dissent, as it is understood, in the concrete life of the church? Further, how much does dissent shape the Baptist movement and the particular church? One could argue that many churches do not, in fact, make room for the voice of dissent. Rather, churches look for uniformity amongst the members. Would one still consider those churches Baptists? If there is room for dissent, then there is always room for soul freedom. Perhaps, then, we could consider the non-dissenting churches and not really Baptists churches. A stance I am leaning towards embracing more and more. Unless these churches are dissenting from the stance of dissent. Then it becomes circular, and still moot if the churches do not leave a space open for dissent. Finally, how is dissent displayed, or practiced, liturgically? Some good things to think about.
Thursday, November 09, 2006
choose your own adventure ethics
I have just finished re-reading Time Past, Time Future by John Gallagher. The work is basically an historical survey of Moral Theology. While the beginning of the work seems fairly harmless, by the end of the work, Gallagher is clearly presenting and pushing a specific theological agenda. But first, a couple of thoughts on the historical survey. It is interesting that Moral Theology arrives from the pastoral rather than the academic context. I wonder what a theology of ethics would look like if it was purly formulated in an academic context. Granted, Gallagher points out the influence of Thomism as Moral Theology emerged and evolved, but it is clear that it began with the priests and confession. Perhaps a better question would be, what is the difference between Moral Theology, in its basic historical root, and Liberation Theology. Both seem to start with the experience of the people, but Moral Theology has had enough years to be sanitized by the academy and the Magisterium. Yet on a deeper level, Moral Theology is responding to the sin of the people and the way to achieve salvation, while Liberation Theology seems to be addressing the salvation of the people and the sin of society. This is a fundamental difference between focusing on the “rule” of God vs. the experience of the people. I am not sure where I would fall with the two – probably somewhere between the two.
Another point that Gallagher makes is the unique nature of American theology. It is something that emerges in the 1890sm, is squished, and then again after VII. Gallagher seems to cautiously be pushing proportionism (the Catholic version of situation ethics al la Fletcher). In proportionism, the individual chooses based on the teological end, the means to the end and the motive of the individual. The magisterium has more or less condemned this approach, but Gallagher still seems to embrace it. I can understand the Magisterium’s caution – such an approach could lead one to make decision leading to things like….abortion (shudder?) or use of birth control (gasp), or who know what else. Yet moral truisms that leave little room for negotiation can (as the proportionists argue) lead to other sins. Ah the muddy realm of ethics… didn’t Wittgenstein say something about the inarticulate nature of ethics?
Another point that Gallagher makes is the unique nature of American theology. It is something that emerges in the 1890sm, is squished, and then again after VII. Gallagher seems to cautiously be pushing proportionism (the Catholic version of situation ethics al la Fletcher). In proportionism, the individual chooses based on the teological end, the means to the end and the motive of the individual. The magisterium has more or less condemned this approach, but Gallagher still seems to embrace it. I can understand the Magisterium’s caution – such an approach could lead one to make decision leading to things like….abortion (shudder?) or use of birth control (gasp), or who know what else. Yet moral truisms that leave little room for negotiation can (as the proportionists argue) lead to other sins. Ah the muddy realm of ethics… didn’t Wittgenstein say something about the inarticulate nature of ethics?
Sharing hope
I just finished re-reading Gaudium et Spes. As a Baptist, I find reading Catholic works interesting. It is difficult for me to give authority that was written by a bunch of men in pointy hat, but I guess millions of Catholics like what they do (or at least they accept the writings). Every time I read GS, I am stirred to dream about the ideal church and the ideal Christian. We have a picture of a church that works towards the betterment of all humanity, that pushes toward economic justice, family values, and the development of science, art, and reason (all within limits). The Christian is the person who has a family, educates the children, pays taxed, and considers the neighbor, all in a days work. It is a nice idea. Of course I need to remember what a breakthrough this work was in 1965. It is a big deal for the OTC (one true church, as my Catholic friend would claim) to say that it is actually interested and connected with the hopes and joys, grief and sorrow of the world. It was as if the church, after 2000 years finally decided to start interacting with the world… well not quite, but close. I wonder if the church can work with society towards the betterment of the individual without losing its own identity (this is a critique I have of liberalism). In this case, GS continues to state that the truth of Jesus Christ is the driving force and the focus of all progress. I suppose that focus would keep one honest. It is an interesting position to take in interfaith dialogue, but probably an authentic one.
Religion and Postmoderism part 4
Moving right along, next we have Robert Bernasconi, “Why Athens and Jerusalem”
This paper looked at the debate between Derrida and Lebiniz, using it as a starting off point to consider the difference and similarity between Jewish thinking and Greek thinking. Bernasconi considered the tension towards Jewish thinking, and its separation from Greek philosophy – or at least the impression that there was a separation. He showed how Lebiniz did not try to separate the two, but looked to a synthesis similar to the Greek translation of the LXX. The works would be Greek in form but Hebrew in context. For example, the Greek concept of justice is a way to articulate the justice that is found in the prophets. I have hardly touched the depth of the paper, and I know I am not even coming close to giving Bernasconi justice in the work he did, his point in the end seemed to be, “why Athens and why Jerusalem?” Why do we need to have these two poles in particular set up? In the current context, we may wonder about Washington D.C. and Tehran, and a pole such as this one has very different philosophical and theological implications. Bernasconi showed that the poles of Athens and Jerusalem no longer seem to hold, but have been synthesized. So, the question that I pull from Bernasconi’s work is, what are the poles today that shape and direct our thinking, politics, theology, and other?
This paper looked at the debate between Derrida and Lebiniz, using it as a starting off point to consider the difference and similarity between Jewish thinking and Greek thinking. Bernasconi considered the tension towards Jewish thinking, and its separation from Greek philosophy – or at least the impression that there was a separation. He showed how Lebiniz did not try to separate the two, but looked to a synthesis similar to the Greek translation of the LXX. The works would be Greek in form but Hebrew in context. For example, the Greek concept of justice is a way to articulate the justice that is found in the prophets. I have hardly touched the depth of the paper, and I know I am not even coming close to giving Bernasconi justice in the work he did, his point in the end seemed to be, “why Athens and why Jerusalem?” Why do we need to have these two poles in particular set up? In the current context, we may wonder about Washington D.C. and Tehran, and a pole such as this one has very different philosophical and theological implications. Bernasconi showed that the poles of Athens and Jerusalem no longer seem to hold, but have been synthesized. So, the question that I pull from Bernasconi’s work is, what are the poles today that shape and direct our thinking, politics, theology, and other?
Monday, November 06, 2006
Religion and Postmodernism part 3
Moving right along, the next paper was presented by Simon Critchley, titled “The Catechism of the Citizen” (this was a change from his original title “The Need for Civil Religion in Politics, Law and Religion in and after Rousseau”).
I have not read much Rousseau at all, so my knowledge of the paper is weak at best. Yet I will still try to give some kind of summary of what I heard.
One of the points that Critchley made which stood out for me was the idea of the law in the social contract. According to Critchley, Rousseau did not agree with Locke or Hume, but saw law as a way to hold the tensions of society together. The law is something that is learned from an early age. Citizens have to be formed to obey the law, and to participate with the general will. Thus a love of law is essential. The law must rule the citizen’s hearts and form the passions. Critchley stated that laws are acts/expressions of the general will. Religion is not a necessary part of the law, but can be used to shape the hearts of the people (or can be a deterrent to call the people away. I know there is much more, but I was nodding off during this presentation, and I am not a Rousseau scholar. A point that I think Critchley was making was that politics can shape a person to obey the law, and can be seen as a form of religion. Or religion can take the form of politics to shape the heart of the individual. The point (if I got it right) is well put. The way we shape individuals in the churches can shape the way they follow (or not) the law. If nothing else, it puts a great deal of power in the hands of politics. I know I missed much in this paper, but this is what I have.
I have not read much Rousseau at all, so my knowledge of the paper is weak at best. Yet I will still try to give some kind of summary of what I heard.
One of the points that Critchley made which stood out for me was the idea of the law in the social contract. According to Critchley, Rousseau did not agree with Locke or Hume, but saw law as a way to hold the tensions of society together. The law is something that is learned from an early age. Citizens have to be formed to obey the law, and to participate with the general will. Thus a love of law is essential. The law must rule the citizen’s hearts and form the passions. Critchley stated that laws are acts/expressions of the general will. Religion is not a necessary part of the law, but can be used to shape the hearts of the people (or can be a deterrent to call the people away. I know there is much more, but I was nodding off during this presentation, and I am not a Rousseau scholar. A point that I think Critchley was making was that politics can shape a person to obey the law, and can be seen as a form of religion. Or religion can take the form of politics to shape the heart of the individual. The point (if I got it right) is well put. The way we shape individuals in the churches can shape the way they follow (or not) the law. If nothing else, it puts a great deal of power in the hands of politics. I know I missed much in this paper, but this is what I have.
Friday, November 03, 2006
Where does faith come from, Kierkegaard?
Let’s take a little break from the Villanova conference. I just finished reading Philosophical Fragments by Soren Kierkegaard. I have to admit, this is not directly for my doctoral work, but is for a reading group I belong to… but then again, everything I read will in one way or another influence my doctoral work.
I also have to admit that I have not read much Kierkegaard – Fear and Trembling in seminary (btw, I am an Andover Newton Theological School alum). So it was a pleasant experience. I particularly liked the idea of a suffering love, and that God makes God’s self become like us out of love. I like the idea of the paradox as the source of one’s passion in learning and growing. What I am stuck on is the idea that faith is given by God. I may have not read closely enough, but I seemed to get the impression in the last chapter that we are not born with faith (a ludicrous thought!), and that we cannot gain faith by just learning about the historical event. The only way we can receive faith is from God. Yet, doesn’t that immediately make the relationship unequal. For Kierkegaard, the suffering love is God becoming one of us, to fully enter into a relationship where we have the opportunity to say “yes.” But how can we say “yes” if we aren’t given the faith from God? I suppose one could take a universalism approach and claim that God has given faith to everyone, and we just need to realize that faith. We would need to be careful to avoid claiming that the faith is a part of our nature – again something that Kierkegaard would see as ludicrous. We can’t share our faith but only out of our own experience. The individual needs to be free to receive the transformation on his or her own. So where does faith come from, if not our own inner-experience.
I also have to admit that I have not read much Kierkegaard – Fear and Trembling in seminary (btw, I am an Andover Newton Theological School alum). So it was a pleasant experience. I particularly liked the idea of a suffering love, and that God makes God’s self become like us out of love. I like the idea of the paradox as the source of one’s passion in learning and growing. What I am stuck on is the idea that faith is given by God. I may have not read closely enough, but I seemed to get the impression in the last chapter that we are not born with faith (a ludicrous thought!), and that we cannot gain faith by just learning about the historical event. The only way we can receive faith is from God. Yet, doesn’t that immediately make the relationship unequal. For Kierkegaard, the suffering love is God becoming one of us, to fully enter into a relationship where we have the opportunity to say “yes.” But how can we say “yes” if we aren’t given the faith from God? I suppose one could take a universalism approach and claim that God has given faith to everyone, and we just need to realize that faith. We would need to be careful to avoid claiming that the faith is a part of our nature – again something that Kierkegaard would see as ludicrous. We can’t share our faith but only out of our own experience. The individual needs to be free to receive the transformation on his or her own. So where does faith come from, if not our own inner-experience.
Wednesday, November 01, 2006
Religion and Postmoderism part 2
The next paper was presented by Stanley Hauerwas, A Haunting Possibility: Christianity and Radical Democracy
Hauerwas started out with a description of R. Coles’ understanding of “radical democracy.” Coles’ stated that his understanding of democracy was haunted by Yoder… we’ll get to that.
Some of the key points (as I understood them) in Coles’ RD are that democracy is a process that we are in search of, it is an activity, and is always beyond the actual democracy as we practice/know it. RD occurs when we go beyond the dominant forms to practice radical hospitality especially to the least of the society. This evokes the idea of preferential option of the poor – a concept that is often found in Liberation theology. The radical hospitality first to the least is a concept that Goizueta suggests. But I digress…
A community that practices RD works on listening, establishing stories, and making space at the table for all stories – similar to the idea that Welch presented.
Hauerwas then turned to Yoder. Yoder claims that politics creates the crucial ground for radical democracy, but it is politics based upon the cross – this is where Coles is haunted. (See Yoder’s Politics of Jesus) Yoder’s idea is connected to tradition, but is still open to others. It strongly challenges what it means to be a disciple of Jesus, it comes out of a community gathered (church), and has to stay connected to Jesus.
This politics is against the politics of Constantine – which is when the church works to learn and see from the world. It is in a level of engagement where the world tells the church what it needs to be.
RD works best on at the local level against the hierarchal. I think this is a very Baptist idea (but then again, Yoder is an Anabaptist), but Hauerwas connected to Augustine. Hauerwas claims that the speech of the empire is an orientation to death that looks to the significance of life. (Also Augustine) In the empire lying, self-deception, and a love of glory are held up. The best response that comes from Christianity is the martyr that does not depend on glory but on the glory of the communion of the saints.
The church is to challenge the world to what it can be, as a people who seek justice rather than glory.
Overall, I think we find a kind of Christ above culture typology (thanks Neibuhr!). The “haunting” challenge is that the politics which Coles is seeking, and many other secularists is only offered by Christianity. Yet where is the space for the other faith? This approach seems to go to the other extreme from Welch’s approach. I like the idea of staying true to the cross, but does staying true to the cross mean you must leave room for other stories. Again, where is the space for evangelism? But I may be missing something…
Hauerwas started out with a description of R. Coles’ understanding of “radical democracy.” Coles’ stated that his understanding of democracy was haunted by Yoder… we’ll get to that.
Some of the key points (as I understood them) in Coles’ RD are that democracy is a process that we are in search of, it is an activity, and is always beyond the actual democracy as we practice/know it. RD occurs when we go beyond the dominant forms to practice radical hospitality especially to the least of the society. This evokes the idea of preferential option of the poor – a concept that is often found in Liberation theology. The radical hospitality first to the least is a concept that Goizueta suggests. But I digress…
A community that practices RD works on listening, establishing stories, and making space at the table for all stories – similar to the idea that Welch presented.
Hauerwas then turned to Yoder. Yoder claims that politics creates the crucial ground for radical democracy, but it is politics based upon the cross – this is where Coles is haunted. (See Yoder’s Politics of Jesus) Yoder’s idea is connected to tradition, but is still open to others. It strongly challenges what it means to be a disciple of Jesus, it comes out of a community gathered (church), and has to stay connected to Jesus.
This politics is against the politics of Constantine – which is when the church works to learn and see from the world. It is in a level of engagement where the world tells the church what it needs to be.
RD works best on at the local level against the hierarchal. I think this is a very Baptist idea (but then again, Yoder is an Anabaptist), but Hauerwas connected to Augustine. Hauerwas claims that the speech of the empire is an orientation to death that looks to the significance of life. (Also Augustine) In the empire lying, self-deception, and a love of glory are held up. The best response that comes from Christianity is the martyr that does not depend on glory but on the glory of the communion of the saints.
The church is to challenge the world to what it can be, as a people who seek justice rather than glory.
Overall, I think we find a kind of Christ above culture typology (thanks Neibuhr!). The “haunting” challenge is that the politics which Coles is seeking, and many other secularists is only offered by Christianity. Yet where is the space for the other faith? This approach seems to go to the other extreme from Welch’s approach. I like the idea of staying true to the cross, but does staying true to the cross mean you must leave room for other stories. Again, where is the space for evangelism? But I may be missing something…
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